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Raising the Bar: Indigent Defense
and the Right to a Partisan Lawyer
by Steven Zeidman*
In Ake v. Oklahoma,' the Supreme Court of the United States held
that an indigent defendant is entitled to the assistance of an expert in
2
cases where it is established that mental health is at issue. Thirty-two
3 the Court finally addressed whether
years later, in McWilliams v. Dunn,
4
an expert must be independent of the prosecution. During oral
argument, counsel for McWilliams argued that Ake required that the
5
expert must be part of the defense team and on the defendant's side.
Justice Gorsuch, in only his second week on the Court, stated dubiously
that if that were the case, then "surely it would also require a partisan
lawyer."6 Although certainly not his intent, Justice Gorsuch's question
should compel a reexamination of the contours of the right to counsel.
Given the complexities and demanding nature of the work and the
intricacies of the relationship between lawyer and client, the accused
7
should indeed be entitled to a partisan lawyer.

*Professor of Law, CUNY School of Law. Duke University School of Law (J.D.,
1981). I thank Mari Curbelo, Tom Klein, and Danilo Curbelo Zeidman for their
encouragement and insight. I also gratefully acknowledge the support of CUNY School of
Law.
1. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
2. Id. at 83.
3. 137 S. Ct. 1790 (2017).
4. Id. at 1800.
5. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, McWilliams v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 1790 (2017) (No.
16-5294).
6. Id. at 27.
7. Webster's defines partisanas "a firm adherent to a party, faction, cause or person;
especially: one exhibiting blind, prejudiced, and unreasoning allegiance." Partisan,
(last
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/partisan
MERRIAM-WEBSTER.CoM,
visited Dec. 10, 2017). The right to partisan counsel is also dictated by the explosion of
collateral consequences that flow from conviction and require counsel's steadfast vigilance.
See, e.g., Jenny Roberts, Ignorance is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence,
and Misinformationin the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 IOWAL. REV. 119 (2009); Gabriel J. Chin
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This Article looks into the motivations of lawyers who represent poor
people accused of crime. Poor criminal defendants must be entitled to
unabashedly and unequivocally partisan lawyers, those fully devoted to
the underlying causes of indigent criminal defense and the case of each
individual client. This Article notes that many lawyers on assigned
counsel plans are former prosecutors and argues that they should not be
permitted to represent indigent defendants unless and until their
attitudes and motivations are vigorously vetted.8
The phrase mass incarceration is now on radar screens across the
country as we grapple with the incarceration explosion and the reality
that 2.2 million people in the United States are currently behind bars.9
While there are myriad reasons posited to explain the jail and prison
growth, there are certain undeniable truths about the 2.2 million-all
were adjudicated, prosecuted, and, for the most part, defended.1 0 While
power in the criminal legal system is vested in the hands of the judiciary
and the prosecution, no one can gainsay that the defense bar had some
role in the massive increase of incarcerated people. At a minimum, it is
necessary to ask just how zealously those 2.2 million were represented.
Historically in New York City, those who are charged with a crime and
are unable to afford counsel have been represented by attorneys from
organizations contracted with the city to provide criminal defense
services, and in cases presenting conflicts of interest, by individual
attorneys from an assigned counsel panel." Several years ago, I served

& Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty
Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697 (2002). The Supreme Court's application of the right to
effective assistance of counsel to plea bargaining also dictates that defense counsel must be
fully devoted to all clients, not just those pursuing a trial. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct.
1399 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
8. For a historical overview of individually assigned counsel systems of indigent
defense, see Junius L. Allison, Relationship Between the Office of Public Defender and the
Assigned Counsel System, 10 VAL. U. L. REV. 399 (1976).
9. See, e.g., Editorial, End Mass Incarceration Now, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2014;
Criminal JusticeFacts, SENTENCING PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/criminaljustice-facts (last visited Feb. 6, 2018).
10. It is tragically not uncommon for defendants charged with lower level offenses to
enter guilty pleas without benefit of counsel. See, e.g., ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL.,
NAT'L AsS'N OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE
TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA'S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS (2009), https://www.

nacdl.org/WorkAreallinkit.aspx?LinkIdentifier=id&ItemID=20808;
Timothy Williams,
Courts Sidestep the Law, and South Carolina'sPoor Go to Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2017;
Jeremy Borden, Immigrants Take Guilty Pleas Without a Lawyer and Can Later be
Deported, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2013.
11. Indigent defendants in New York State are provided counsel pursuant to article
18-B of the County Law. N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 722 (LexisNexis 1968). New York City's
indigent defense plan was initially spelled out in Executive Order No. 178, City of New
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on the screening committee overseeing membership on the assigned
counsel panel. 12 Chief among our responsibilities was reviewing
applications from attorneys seeking to be placed on the panel. 13
Early on in my tenure, we reviewed the application of a person who
had recently resigned from a local district attorney's office after three
years as a prosecutor. He sailed through the process as everyone on the
screening committee seemed to assume he had all the experience
required to be on the panel. It was apparently of no moment that he had
never advocated for anyone charged with a crime or counseled someone
faced with the overwhelming decision of whether to accept a plea or go to
trial, and no one asked him why he now suddenly wanted to defend.
As I looked deeper into the composition of the assigned counsel panel,
I learned that it was populated by a majority of former prosecutors. That
recognition led me to examine the contours of the right to counsel to try
and ascertain what the accused was entitled to by way of his attorney's
attitude toward him and toward indigent criminal defense in general.
Over fifty years ago, in Gideon v. Wainwright,14 the Supreme Court
held that states must provide lawyers for indigent defendants accused of
16
felonies.15 Almost ten years later, in Argersinger v. Hamlin, the Court
expanded Gideon's reach to essentially require counsel for
misdemeanors.1 7 However, while states were now required to provide
York, Office of the Mayor (Nov. 27, 1965). For discussions of the three basic types of indigent
defense systems (public defender, individually assigned counsel, and contract
organizations), see ROBERT L. SPANGENBERG ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, NATIONAL CRIMINAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS STUDY (1986); Floyd Feeney
& Patrick G. Jackson, Public Defenders, Assigned Counsel, Retained Counsel:Does the Type
of CriminalDefense Counsel Matter?, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 361 (1991). The last comprehensive
survey of indigent defense services nationwide examined the country's 100 most populous
counties. It found that individually assigned counsel handled 15%, or 630,000, of the overall
4.2 million cases. See Carol J. Frances & Marika F. X. Litras, Indigent Defense Services in
Large Counties, 1999, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULL. (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Washington,
D.C.), Nov. 2000, at 1, https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/idslc99.pdf.
12. For a discussion of the responsibilities of the screening committee, see In re Central
Screening Committee of the Appellate Division First Department, 906 N.Y.S.2d 435 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2010).
13. Panel attorneys are paid $60 an hour for misdemeanors and $75 an hour for
felonies. See Assigned Counsel Plan 18B, NYCOURTS, https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/
AD1/Committees&Programs/18B/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 10, 2018).
14. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
15. Id. at 344-45.
16. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
17. Id. at 37-38. The Court declared that a defendant could not be incarcerated in any
case-felony, misdemeanor, or even petty offense or violation-unless the defendant had
been provided counsel. Id. Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, observed that even
seemingly minor offenses could involve complex factual and legal issues, and that "[t]he
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attorneys for poor people accused of crimes, the Court did not speak
directly to the quality of representation those lawyers needed to provide.
While the physical presence of a defense attorney was now a necessary
condition to most criminal prosecutions, the presence alone could not be
sufficient to satisfy the Sixth Amendment. 18
In the years after Gideon, the Court vacillated between phrases such
as "reasonably competent," 19 "adequate," 20 and (merely) "competent"21
when describing the quality of lawyering owed to the accused. Then, in
United States v. Cronic,22 the Court seemed to settle on the notion that
the accused was entitled to the effective assistance of counsel. 23
As the saying goes, the devil is in the details, and the appellate courts
struggled trying to define effective, adequate, or even competent
assistance. 24 However, rather than affirmatively delineate the
component parts of effective assistance, the Supreme Court addressed
the issue by creating a two-pronged test for postconviction claims of
ineffective assistance: the defendant must show that the attorney's
performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" 25 and
that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different." 26 Specifically and clearly eschewing calls to articulate a
comprehensive list of a defense lawyer's duties, the Court held that
consequences of a misdemeanor conviction, whether they be a brief period served under the
sometimes deplorable conditions found in local jails or the effect of a criminal record on
employability, are frequently of sufficient magnitude not to be casually dismissed by the
label 'petty."' Id. at 47-48.
18. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... the Assistance
of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
19. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770 (1970).
20. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980) (holding that the Constitution
guarantees "adequate legal assistance").
21. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 (1982).
22. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
23. Id. at 654. "It has long been recognized that the right to counsel is the right to
effective assistance of counsel." McMann, 397 U.S. at 771 n.14. Yet, several subsequent
cases still refer to the right to "adequate" representation. See, e.g., Caplin & Drysdale v.
United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624 (1989). At a Justice Department event honoring the fiftieth
anniversary of Gideon, Justice Kagan observed that the accused had no right to a "Cadillac"
defense but was at least entitled to "Ford Taurus" representation. See Debra Cassens Weiss,
Kagan Says Poor Defendants are Entitled to a 'FordTaurus' Defense, A.B.A. J., Mar. 19,
2013.
24. At one point, courts considered whether counsel's performance rendered the trial a
"mockery of justice." United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376, 379 (1949). See also Bottiglio v.
United States, 431 F.2d 930, 931 (1970) (per curiam).
25. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
26. Id. at 694.
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"specific guidelines are not appropriate. The Sixth Amendment refers
simply to 'counsel,' not specifying particular requirements of effective
assistance." 27
In the years since Strickland v. Washington,28 defendants frequently
raise ineffective assistance claims on appeal. 29 While there is much
scholarly support for the validity of those claims, 30 the courts, whether
finding that defense counsel performed reasonably or that the defendant
failed to show prejudice, have generally been unreceptive. 31
Still, most ineffective assistance claims have focused on trialsdefense counsel's preparation for and performance at trial. 32 What about
other aspects of defense lawyering, such as counsel's attitude toward and
relationship with the client?
In Morris v. Slappy,33 the defendant's public defender, who had
represented him at a preliminary hearing and supervised extensive
investigation, was hospitalized for emergency surgery shortly before
trial. Another public defender was assigned six days before trial. The
California Superior Court denied the defendant's request for a
continuance, and the defendant was ultimately convicted. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction,
finding that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused a right to
counsel with whom he has a meaningful attorney-client relationship and,
more specifically, the Sixth Amendment would be without substance if it
34
did not include such a right.
The Supreme Court of the United States reinstated the conviction and
sharply criticized the Ninth Circuit for creating what it referred to as "a
35
new constitutional standard which is unsupported by any authority."
The Court seemed to mock the Ninth Circuit's opinion by referring to it
27. Id. at 688. Justice Marshall criticized the majority for failing to delineate specific
standards. Id. at 709 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
28. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
29. "Ineffective assistance of counsel is one of the most-if not the most--common
appeal grounds asserted by convicted criminal defendants as appellants." JOHN M.
BURKOFF & HOPE L. HUDSON, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 1-3 (1994).
30. See, e.g., William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and
PracticalUndermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91 (1995).
31. See, e.g., Steven Zeidman, To Pleador Not to Plead:Effective Assistance and ClientCentered Counseling, 39 B.C. L. REV. 841 n.34 (1998); Alan W. Clarke, Procedural
Labyrinths and the Injustice of Death: A Critique of Death Penalty Habeas Corpus, 29 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1327, 1362 (1995) (To succeed on an ineffective assistance claim, the
defendant "must have had truly abysmal lawyering.").
32. See Zeidman, supra note 31, at 844-45.
33. 461 U.S. 1 (1983).
34. Id. at 3-5.
35. Id. at 12.
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as a "novel idea" adding a "novel ingredient" to the Sixth Amendment,
ultimately writing that "[n]o court could possibly guarantee that a
defendant will develop the kind of rapport with his attorney-privately
retained or provided by the public-that the Court of Appeals thought
part of the Sixth Amendment." 36
Courts have since embraced the notion that the nature and quality of
the attorney-client relationship is irrelevant to considerations of effective
assistance. Numerous courts have treated defense counsel as fungible
and replaceable at any time during the pendency of the case. The
defendant in Siers v. Ryan37 challenged the lack of continuity of counsel
assigned to him by the Defender Association of Philadelphia. He argued
that assigning him different attorneys at different stages of the litigation
violated the Sixth Amendment. 38 Relying on Slappy, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the right to counsel did
not include the corollary right to any special rapport or even confidence
in appointed counsel.3 9 Instead, the court emphasized the right to counsel
is no more than the right to competent counsel. 40
In United States v. Griffiths,4 1 defense counsel suffered a stroke at the
conclusion of the trial testimony, and rather than grant a continuance or
a mistrial, the judge appointed new counsel to deliver the defense
summation, even though that attorney had not been present to see any
part of the trial.4 2 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit upheld the defendant's conviction, stating that the Sixth
Amendment guarantees only an effective advocate, not the accused's
preferred advocate (meaning, the lawyer with whom he had an
established relationship). 4 3
Prisoners' rights cases also raise questions regarding the nature of the
relationship between client and lawyer. In Mann v. Reynolds,44 deathrow and high-maximum-security prisoners challenged a prison policy
prohibiting barrier-free visits with legal counsel.4 5 The plaintiffs argued
that the restrictions on contact inhibited the formation of the relationship
36. Id. at 13-14.
37. 773 F.2d 37 (3d Cir. 1985).
38. Id. at 39-40.
39. Id. at 44.
40. Id.
41. 750 F.3d 237 (2d Cir. 2014).
42. Id. at 239-41.
43. Id. at 241.
44. 46 F.3d 1055 (10th Cir. 1995).
45. The counsel visits took place in a booth with a wire mesh plexiglass partition.
Communication was by telephone in the booth, and documents had to be passed through a
two-inch hole drilled through the partition. Id. at 1056.
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necessary for open and honest dialogue about sensitive matters.4 6 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that "[u]ntil it
can be established as a general principle emotional bonding is required
for the kind of counseling that meets constitutional muster, we are
unwilling to find such a need within the confines of the Sixth
Amendment." 47
Perhaps no line of cases better expresses the courts' disdain for the
claim that the accused is entitled to at least some kind of meaningful
relationship with counsel than those involving defense counsel who is
applying to or has already accepted a job offer with the very district
attorney's office prosecuting his client.

In Plumlee v. Masto,4 8 the defendant was charged with robbery and

murder and was assigned the deputy public defender as counsel. Plumlee
subsequently heard a rumor that the chief deputy public defender was
good friends with Plumlee's roommate, who was also a suspect in the
crime. Plumlee believed that the chief deputy public defender leaked to
his roommate that Plumlee intended to name him as the murderer.
Plumlee also did not trust the deputy public defender, his actual lawyer,
because he had applied to the district attorney's office before he was
appointed to represent Plumlee. In fact, he received and accepted a job
offer from the district attorney while he was representing Plumlee, and
a new lawyer from the public defender's office was assigned. 49
Plumlee's new lawyer moved to be relieved (personally and on behalf
of the public defender's office as a whole) because of Plumlee's
understandable lack of trust in the entire office. The trial judge denied
the motion and told Plumlee that his only choices were to continue with
his most recently assigned public defender or represent himself. Plumlee
opted for self-representation and was handily convicted.50 The Ninth

46. Id. at 1058.
47. Id. at 1060. The court added, "There are simply no cases presented to us in which
courts have measured counsel's effectiveness by the strength of counsel's emotional bonds
with the client." Id. In similar fashion, elected officials denigrate the need for defense
attorneys to develop relationships with their clients. See, e.g., Jessica Miller, Appellate
Attorney Firedfor Speaking About Lack of Funding in Utah Death PenaltyCase, SALT LAKE
TRIBUNE, Nov. 6, 2017 (County commissioner terminated attorney's contract to handle
death penalty cases, questioning why he was communicating so often with his client and
stating, "I don't agree with giving a guy an open checkbook because he wants to create a
relationship with a convicted felon on the taxpayers' dime.")
48. 512 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2008).
49. Id. at 1206.
50. Id at 1206-07.
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Circuit affirmed, finding no violation of the right to effective assistance
of counsel. 51
Plumlee is not sui generis. Other cases with similar facts raise
questions regarding whether defense counsel's efforts to obtain
employment with the district attorney's office created an impermissible
conflict of interest. In Commonwealth v. Agbanyo, 52 the defendant
learned on the morning of trial that his privately-retained attorney had
accepted a job offer from the very same office that was prosecuting him.
The defendant consented to having his attorney remain as his counsel
and was convicted. 53 The Massachusetts Appeals Court held that defense
counsel's future employment as a prosecutor did not create a per se actual
conflict. 54
In Garcia v. Bunnell,5 5 defense counsel announced on the morning of
trial that at the end of the case he would be joining the district attorney's
office. 56 The Ninth Circuit found no actual conflict of representation and
"no . . . active representation of competing interests."57 The court did,
however, appear cognizant of at least the appearance of impropriety,
stating, "We generally presume that the lawyer is fully conscious of the
overarching duty of complete loyalty to his or her client."58 The court was
even more candid in its acknowledgement and acceptance of the ways
that lawyers seemed regularly to switch sides: "Given the inherently
transitory nature of representation in the area of criminal law .

.

. we

must significantly rely on the integrity of counsel in evaluating such
potential conflicts."59
A slight variation on the theme of criminal lawyers as fungible is
exemplified by State v. Bowen.60 At his preliminary hearing, Bowen's
lawyer was the prosecutor who obtained prior convictions against him
years earlier that the current prosecutor sought to introduce at trial as

51. Id. at 1206.
52. 872 N.E.2d 758 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007).
53. Id. at 760.
54. Id. at 765. In a long line of cases, courts distinguish between an actual conflict of
interest and a potential conflict. If an actual conflict is established, then the prejudice
required pursuant to the Strickland v. Washington test for ineffective assistance is
presumed. If the conflict is deemed to be potential, then the defendant bears the burden of
proving prejudice in order to prevail.
55. 33 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 1994).
56. Id. at 1194-95.
57. Id. at 1198.
58. Id. at 1198-99 (quoting Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 784 (1987)).
59. Id. at 1199.
60. 299 Kan. 339 (2014).
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propensity evidence.61 The Kansas Supreme Court held that the defense
lawyer's stint as the prosecutor who helped send the defendant to jail a
decade earlier is not the type of conflict of interest that requires
62
automatic reversal under the Sixth Amendment.
Additionally, there are cases directly confronting how defense
attorneys actually and openly feel about their client. A particularly
63
troubling and revealing case is United States v. O'Connor. Two days
before trial, defense counsel filed a motion to withdraw, citing an Ethical
Consideration (EC) set out in the New York Lawyer's Code of
Professional Responsibility (since replaced by the New York Rules of
Professional Conduct), providing that a lawyer should decline
employment if the intensity of his personal feelings might impair his
effective representation. 64 Defense counsel made abundantly clear that
his feelings of disgust toward his client would affect his representation,
stating, inter alia, that his past successes in defending criminal cases
were largely due to 'the strength of [his] moral conviction[] and [his]
65
ability to convey that moral conviction' to juries." He added that he
"could probably go through the motions" but that his heart would not be
in it.66 To make the depths of his feelings perfectly clear, he informed the
judge that his personal, moral, and religious beliefs created issues for
him.67

61. Id. at 342. Bowen at that point orally waived the apparent conflict of interest. The
attorney withdrew from representing Bowen two months later when the prosecution
formally moved to admit the prior crimes evidence. Id. at 343-44. The court noted that
while Bowen's oral waiver of the conflict may not have satisfied the ethical dictates of the
Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct, it was not a structural error requiring automatic
reversal. Id. at 346.
62. Id. at 347. Apparently, it is a different situation if a juror is seeking employment
with the prosecutor's office. In People v. Southall, the defendant's murder conviction was
reversed because a juror failed to disclose that she was pursuing a position with the
prosecuting attorney's office (the Manhattan, New York District Attorney). 156 A.D.3d 111,
118 (N.Y. 2017). The court held that the juror's assertions of impartiality were irrelevant
because her "implied bias" was incurable, and therefore, the defendant's right to a fair trial
before an impartial jury had been violated. Id. at 124.
63. 650 F.3d 839 (2d Cir. 2011).
64. Id. at 848. EC 2-30. See N.Y. JUD. LAW APP. (McKinney 2006). Defense counsel
began representing the defendant in February 2008. In March, the trial was scheduled for
April 28. On April 24, defense counsel moved to withdraw in a written motion that
explained that upon receipt of a used condom (alleged to have been recovered from his
client) bearing the victim's DNA, he had an immediate and involuntary shift in his "moral
and technical perspective on [the] case." O'Connor, 650 F.3d at 849.
65. O'Connor, 650 F.3d at 849.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 851.
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The judge denied his motion to withdraw, stating that "'I don't think
the law requires zealousness. . . . I think it requires adequacy"' and that
he was sure defense counsel would continue to provide "appropriate"
representation.6 8
The defendant was ultimately convicted, and on appeal, claimed the
judge's decision to deny counsel's motion to withdraw denied him his
right to a fair trial.6 9 The Second Circuit disagreed. 70 The court held that
defense counsel conflated EC 2-30 (factors to consider before accepting a
case) with EC 2-29 (grounds for withdrawing following appointment).7 1
EC 2-29 provides that counsel should not seek to withdraw except for
"compelling reasons" and expressly states that "repugnance of the subject
matter" does not qualify as a compelling reason. 72
Other cases reach a similar result even when the lawyer's loathing of
the client was present at the outset of his representation. In Hale v.
Gibson,78 the very first thing defense counsel did after being appointed
was file an application to withdraw because he suspected the defendant,
his new client, of having attempted to burglarize his office about one year
earlier: "Because of this, this applicant has a personal dislike, distrust
and animosity toward the Defendant which will prevent desirable
communication and trust that is necessary to an attorney-client
relationship."74
The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma
denied the application, finding that defense counsel would not permit
personalities to affect his relationship with or representation of the
defendant. 75 The defendant was ultimately convicted of murder and
sentenced to death.7 6
Hale raised the conflict of interest issue on direct appeal, and the
Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma found "no abuse of the [trial]
court's discretion in requiring counsel to overcome his personal feelings

68. Id. at 850.
69. Id. at 851.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. EC 2-29. Notably, the most recent version of the American Bar Association
Standards for Criminal Justice provides that "qualified defense counsel should not seek to
avoid appointment . . . except for good cause, such as: . . . the client or the crime is so
repugnant to the lawyer that it will likely prejudicially impair the lawyer's ability to provide
quality representation." AM. BAR AsS'N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE DEFENSE
FUNCTION STANDARD, STANDARD § 4-2.1 (4th ed. 2015).
73. 227 F.3d 1298 (10th Cir. 2000).
74. Id. at 1310.
75. Id. at 1308.
76. Id.
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and to represent Hale."77 Citing Slappy, the court held that "[t]here is no
78
constitutional right to an attorney client relationship free of animosity."
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, stating that "[u]nder Hale's view, any time
that counsel dislikes his or her client, the defendant could claim a conflict
79
of interest. This is not the state of the law."
Courts are similarly dismissive when it is the accused, as opposed to
their lawyer, who requests a change in representation. In People v.
Linares,8 0 the trial judge for the New York County Supreme Court asked
why the defendant was brought out in handcuffs. Defense counsel replied
that it was because the defendant had verbally abused him and
threatened to cut him. The defendant denied that accusation and,
unsurprisingly, stated he had no confidence in his attorney and asked for
a new lawyer.81 New York State's highest court held that the defendant
had not established good cause for the trial judge to replace counsel, and
the Sixth Amendment did not require a "harmonious" attorney-client
relationship.82
However, to be clear, a defendant with access to money need not be
saddled with a lawyer he does not want (or that does not want him for a
client). Courts have long recognized the accused's right to hire counsel of
choice. 83 Those who are able to pay for an attorney can search for a
meaningful relationship with counsel and do not have to, and surely
would not, endure representation marked by animosity or even
disharmony. As one commentator trenchantly observed:
If a defendant does not have a reasonable opportunity to employ
counsel of choice, the right to be heard by counsel becomes worthless.
A defendant who can afford to retain counsel of choice chooses an
attorney on skill, experience, and a special relationship of trust. If a
defendant is not provided the opportunity to select his own counsel,

77. Hale v. State, 750 P.2d 130, 135 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988).
78. Id.
79. Hale, 227 F.3d at 1313.
80. 813 N.E.2d 609 (2004).
81. Id. at 610-11.
82. Id. at 612.
83. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006); Caplin, 491 U.S. at
624-25 (1989); Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988); United States v. Laura,
607 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir. 1979) ("Attorneys are not fungible, as are eggs, apples and
oranges."). Taking the right to counsel of choice even one step further, the Colorado
Supreme Court recently held that the right includes the right to fire retained counsel
without having to show good cause, even when the defendant wants a public defender as a
replacement. Ronquillo v. Colorado, 404 P.3d 264, 269-70 (Col. 2017).
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the basic trust between counsel and client that is fundamental to the
adversarial system would be impaired. 84
It is an entirely different matter for indigent defendants. The oftrepeated line is that you are entitled to a lawyer but not one of your
choosing, and that is the case even if you do not like, respect, or trust
your court-appointed lawyer, or he does not like, respect, or trust you. 8 5
The problems associated with indigent defendants being tethered to
their appointed counsel is compounded by constitutional and ethical
rules regarding the allocation of decision-making authority between
lawyer and client. In Jones v. Barnes,86 The Supreme Court observed, in
dicta, that it was "recognized that the accused has the ultimate authority
to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether
to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an
appeal."8 7 Virtually all other decisions are deemed to be strategic or
tactical in nature and are ceded to defense counsel. 8 8 As a result, once an
indigent defendant accepts what he is constitutionally entitled tomeaning, a lawyer-he forfeits the right to make a host of decisions
affecting the outcome of his case and his very future. It is therefore
critical to ensure that only partisan lawyers-those who bleed for their
clients, who stay up nights agonizing over each case they handle and
what they could have done better, who trek out to jails and prisons in the
heat of the summer and the cold of the winter, who are fully and
unequivocally committed and faithful to their clients-are permitted to
represent indigent defendants.
The importance of the attorney-client relationship in criminal cases is
irrefutable, even if the Supreme Court is unwilling to proclaim that it is
constitutionally required. In fact, the Court has acknowledged generally

84. Michael E. Lubowitz, The Right to Counsel of Choice After Wheat v. United States:
Whose Choice Is It?, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 437, 444-45 (1990).
85. See, e.g., Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 151. ("[The right to counsel of choice does not
extend to defendants who require counsel to be appointed for them."); Caplin, 491 U.S. at
624; Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159 ("[W]hile the right to select and be represented by one's
preferred attorney is comprehended by the Sixth Amendment, the essential aim of the
Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than
to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers.").
But see Janet Moore, The Antidemocratic Sixth Amendment, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1705, 1730
(2017) (arguing that the Supreme Court's language seeming to limit an indigent defendant's
right to choose counsel is mere dicta).
86. 463 U.S. 745 (1983).
87. Id. at 751. The Court has also held that a defendant may choose to eschew counsel
and act as his or her own advocate. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 813-14 (1975).
88. See AM. BAR ASs'N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE DEFENSE FUNCTION,
STANDARD § 4-5.2 (4th ed. 2015).
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the critical role played by criminal defense counsel, using almost
spiritual words and phrases referring to defense counsel's "different
90
mission"89 and the accused's need for counsel's "guiding hand." When
the Court held in Cronic that the right to counsel included the right to
effective assistance, it simultaneously highlighted the importance of
91
counsel providing meaningful adversarial testing of the charges.
Surely, counsel's ability to provide meaningful representation,
assistance, or adversarial testing is enhanced when there is a meaningful
92
attorney-client relationship. In their concurring opinion in Slappy,
Justices Brennan and Marshall noted the importance of "a relationship
characterized by trust and confidence," 93 especially because a defendant
may need "to disclose embarrassing and intimate information to his
attorney." 94
Scholars have also recognized the magnitude of the relationship
between lawyer and client in criminal cases:
All criminal defenders know that nothing matters more for effective
assistance of counsel than a client-lawyer relationship in which the
client trusts the lawyer, at least somewhat. Without trust, the client
won't share information with the lawyer, won't take the lawyer's
advice. . . . Admittedly, the constitutional standard for effective
assistance does not require a "meaningful relationship" between
lawyer and client; but that merely illustrates the debased level of the
courts' effective-assistance jurisprudence.... The real-world standard,
and the ethical standard, demand far more trust than the
95
constitutional minimum.
The American Bar Association (ABA) Standards do indeed place a
higher premium on the nature and quality of the attorney-client

89. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256 (1967).
90. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
91. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656-57. See also Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 212 (6th Cir.

1981) ("Basic trust between counsel and defendant is the cornerstone of the adversary
system and effective assistance of counsel.").
92. Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred in the result denying the defendant's
appeal because he failed to file a timely motion for continuance. They took issue with the
majority's discussion of the defendant's right to a meaningful relationship with counsel.
Slappy, 461 U.S. at 20-21.
93. Id. at 21 (Brennan, J., concurring).
94. Id.
95. David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guantanamo, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1981,

1992-93 (2008); see also Anne Poulin, Strengthening the Criminal Defendant's Right to

Counsel, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1213, 1250 (2006) ("Counsel's view of the defendant, as well
as the defendant's trust or mistrust of counsel, plays a role in determining the course of the
defendant's representation.").
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relationship than the Supreme Court. ABA Defense Function Standard
4-3.1(a) provides that "[i]mmediately upon appointment . . . defense
counsel should work to establish a relationship of trust and confidence
with

each

client."9 6

The commentary

to the previous

version of

Standard 4-3.197 refers to "the relationship of trust and confidence for
which defense counsel should strive,"98 and notes that "the trust and
confidence inherent in a well-functioning attorney-client relationship is
so important."9 9
Most public defender offices recognize and stress the importance of the
attorney-client relationship and strive, as challenging as it might be, to
ensure that they hire only those lawyers who truly and passionately want
to represent poor people accused of crime. 00 They try to ascertain and
gauge each applicant's motivations' 0 and hopefully get it right
substantially more often than they get it wrong. It is admittedly a
challenge to figure out who has the right stuff-motivations, qualities,
characteristics, background, experience, and, yes, partisanship-to
represent poor people accused of crime, but the type of vetting critical to
public defender offices must be replicated in some manner for assigned
counsel plans, especially for applicants with prosecutorial backgrounds.
There are already numerous obstacles between indigent defendants
and their attorneys, as most lawyers neither look like their clients nor
come from similar backgrounds.1 02 There is also the lack of trust
96. AM. BAR ASS'N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS

FOR THE

DEFENSE FUNCTION,

STANDARD 4-3.1(a) (4th ed. 2015).
97. The commentary to the extant ABA Defense Function Standards has not yet been
completed.
98. AM. BAR ASS'N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE

DEFENSE FUNCTION,

STANDARD 4-3.1(a) cmt. a (4th ed. 2015).
99. Id.
100. See Janet Moore & Andrew L.B. Davies, Knowing Defense, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
345, 361 (2017) (stating that public defenders surfaced the attorney-client relationship as
one of the major themes that should be researched to improve the delivery of public
defense). A study of public defender clients found that client satisfaction was closely
correlated with the nature and quality of the communication between lawyer and client.
Marla Sandys & Heather Pruss, Correlates of Satisfaction Among Clients of a Public
Defender Agency, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 431, 458 (2017).
101. For a discussion of motivations for public defense work, see Barbara Babcock,
Defending the Guilty, 32 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 175 (1983-84).
102. See, e.g., Kate Weisburd, Prosecutors Hide, Defendants Seek: The Erosion of Brady
Through the Defendant Due Diligence Rule, 60 UCLA L. REV. 138, 173 (2012) ("Perceived
and real differences in race and socioeconomic status also affect communication between
clients and their lawyers. The criminal justice system disproportionately impacts poor
people of color, whereas lawyers are disproportionately white and less likely to be poor.");
Shani M. King, Race, Identity and Professional Responsibility: Why Legal Services
Organizations Need African-American Staff Attorneys, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1
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occasioned by a defendant's rational skepticism about a lawyer given to
103
Why add yet
him for free by the very government prosecuting him.
another difference into the equation by foisting on the accused a lawyer
whose previous experience was prosecuting people in the very same
situation as the accused now finds themselves?
This Article is avowedly and purposely not about the debate whether
104
This is about whether
good people can or should be prosecutors.
prosecutors can or should become institutional defense attorneys for poor
people who have no say in the matter of who will represent them. Of
course, it is true that many former prosecutors are excellent criminal
defense attorneys, but that refrain is usually raised in the context of a
prosecutor becoming a privately retained defense attorney, not lawyers
making their career defending poor people. Further, those examples
usually stress the attorney's trial skills and, as even the Supreme Court
has recognized, current criminal practice is defined by plea bargaining
that places a premium on a lawyer's negotiating and counseling
experience and skill.105
Former prosecutors on assigned counsel panels raise three specific
concerns. First, what motivated that person to prosecute; what was, or
still is, their attitude about crime and the accused? Second, regardless of
initial motivation to prosecute, the phenomenon of office acculturation,
consciously or subconsciously fitting in, or conforming to institutional
06
I am
norms and expectations, affects all of us in the workplace.
reminded of a former criminal defense clinic student who went out of her
(2008); Michelle S. Jacobs, People from the Footnotes: The Missing Element in ClientCentered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 345, 374 (1997) (discussing the ways that
attorney-client relationships are affected by race, gender, and culture); Muneer I. Ahmad,

Interpreting Communities: Lawyering Across Language Difference, 53 UCLA L. REV. 999
(2007).

103. See, e.g., Steven Zeidman, Sacrificial Lambs or the Chosen Few?: The Impact of
Student Defenders on the Rights of the Accused, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 853, 890 (1996) (stating
clients distrust institutional indigent defense attorneys); Gary Goodpaster, The Adversary
System, Advocacy, and Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& Soc. CHANGE 59, 74 (1986) ("[D]efendants often do not trust defense counsel, particularly
when the attorneys are public defenders or court appointees."). Recently, a number of public
defenders in Los Angeles signed a petition protesting the appointment of the interim chief
defender asserting, inter alia, that her previous work defending sheriffs deputies in
excessive force lawsuits would hurt their ability to build trust with their clients. Lorelei
Laird, More than 150 Deputy Public Defenders Protect Appointment of Chief they Believe
Unqualified, ABA J. (Feb. 13, 2018).
104. See, e.g., Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHIcs 355 (2001).
105. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1399; Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1376.
106. See, e.g., Charles A. O'Reilly & Jennifer A. Chatman, Culture as Social Control:
Corporations,Cults, and Commitment, 18 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 157 (1996).
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way to tell me that she was a fair-minded prosecutor with the admiration
and respect of the defense community. Suffice it to say that was not
exactly the way the institutional defense lawyers described her. It is
impossible to discount the powerful impact of organizational culture "as
a social control system is based on shared norms and values that set
expectations about appropriate attitudes and behavior for members of
the group"10 7 and that provides a "normative order, operating through
informational and social influence, that guides and constrains the
people's behavior."10 8 Further, the overwhelming majority of assigned
counsel attorneys are solo practitioners who, unlike attorneys in public
defender offices, are not exposed to the norms, ethos, and expectations of
an office devoted to defending poor people accused of crime.
Professor Paul Butler, a former prosecutor, writes about the impact of
the adversarial system, law-and-order culture, and the politics of crime
on people who go into prosecution with a progressive agenda.109
According to Butler, "most prosecutors don't see advancing the
defendant's interests as part of their job"110 because it is "the other side's
responsibility to argue in favor of civil liberties.""1 ' Butler describes the
office culture of winning, defined as getting tough sentences and
defeating defendants' claims that the police violated their constitutional
rights. 112 He goes on to explain that "the culture of the workplace
engenders suspicion against prosecutors with too many progressive
values, translating it as too much sympathy toward defendants or too
much suspicion of the police. It's not that people think you are a bad
person, it's just that they wonder why you became a prosecutor."1 13 Third,
why do these former prosecutors now want to defend poor people accused
of crime; what is their motivation to now defend the very people they had
just been prosecuting?114
In addition to thinking hard about whether someone has the right
motivation for representing the indigent accused, there is the question of
ongoing justifications; what will sustain a lawyer for poor people accused
of crime? Professor Charles Ogletree, former head of the Public Defender
107. Id. at 160.
108. Id.
109. PAUL BUTLER, LET'S GET FREE: A HIP-Hop THEORY OF JUSTICE 114-18 (2009).
110. Id. at 114.
111. Id. at 115.
112. Id. at 116.
113. Id. at 117.
114; While it is obviously anecdotal, it was my sense that most former prosecutors in
New York City sought to join the assigned counsel plan in order to supplement their income
or to generate a stable source of income. I did not get the impression that they were
motivated out of a heartfelt desire to aid poor people accused of crime.
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Service in Washington, D.C., suggested that feelings of empathy and
heroism could forestall burnout and enable public defenders to remain
fully committed and inspired by their work and their clients. 115 Professor
Abbe Smith, also a former public defender, proposed a "three-pronged
model of respect, craft, and a sense of outrage," writing that "[d]efenders
who approach the work out of respect for client, pride in craft, and a sense
of outrage about inequality, injustice, and the routine abuse of power by
those in a position to wield it are able to sustain their careers despite the
systemic incentives to fail." 116 Every lawyer on an assigned counsel panel
should feel the full measure of empathy, heroism, respect for client, pride
in craft, and sense of outrage about the abuse of power by those who wield
it envisioned by Ogletree and Smith. If we cannot ensure that degree of
devotion, then at the very least, we should guarantee that indigent
defendants do not get lawyers who were, or may well still be, partisans
for the prosecution.

115. Charles Ogletree, Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public
Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239 (1993).
116. Abbe Smith, Too Much Heart and Not Enough Heat: The Short Life and Fractured
Ego of the Empathic, Heroic Public Defender, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1203, 1208 (2004).
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